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Gridlock and Beyond in Global Health 
 
Garrett Wallace Brown and David Held 
 
It is commonplace to argue that the cooperative properties of global governance 
have not kept pace with the growth and associated challenges of globalization.  
Many scholars and policymakers often claim that the current multilateral order 
is ‘unfit for purpose’ (Goldin, 2013), and that cooperation has failed to offer 
reliable crisis management (Broome et. al., 2015; Gill, 2015; Held & Roger, 2013). 
Even Xi Jinping has recently stated that multilateralism is ‘increasingly unable to 
deliver long-term solutions for sustainable coexistence’ (2016). The 
predominant view of global governance is that global cooperation is in a 
‘permanent deficit’ (Lamy, 2014), that this condition represents a ‘governance 
dilemma’ (Keohane, 2002), and that effective governance has become 
increasingly ‘gridlocked’ (Hale, et al., 2013).  
 
In relation to global health governance, assigning such a negative prognoses is 
not straightforward. This is because global health governance has in many ways 
witnessed something of a governance boom over the last sixteen years with 
many positive effects (Youde, 2014). Global health has had an explosion of new 
international health actors, development assistance for health (DAH), 
multisectoral bodies, private foundations, private-public partnerships, bilateral 
initiatives, multilateral initiatives and new policy directives channeled through 
traditional United Nations mechanisms. Since the year 2000, global health 
governance has seen the establishment of key global health institutions and 
governance mechanisms, such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis 
and Malaria (GFATM), the GAVI Alliance, the Vaccine Alliance, and the 2005 
International Health Regulations (IHR), as well as the addition of a number of 
major private organizations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. With 
this increased interest in health came new promises for aid delivery and global 
health ‘partnerships’, which were articulated through the health policy 
components of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the Paris Declaration 
on Aid Effectiveness, its reiterations in Accra and Busan, and now within the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In terms of funding, between 2000 and 
2013 annual DAH tripled from US10.8 billion to US31.3 billion, signifying an 
annualized growth rate of over 11% (IHME, 2015).  
 
Nevertheless, despite the growth in DAH and increased calls within the MDGs 
and SDGs for a coordinated global cooperation in health, it would still be overly 
enthusiastic to claim that the overall condition of global health cooperation has 
improved to the point where global health governance is substantially ‘fit for 
purpose’, or that global health outcomes adequately reflect the growth of global 
health actors, DAH and the health risks associated with globalization. 
Accordingly, although global health governance is unlike some other policy 
sectors - in that it has witnessed substantially increased activity - it still suffers 
from its own unique symptoms of gridlock. For example, although there have 
been some successes in meeting MDGs 4 and 5 (to reduce child mortality and 
improve maternal health), the consensus is that the goals went largely unmet 
(UNICFF, 2013).  In addition, as in the case of Ebola and the rise of extensively 
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drug-resistant tuberculosis (XDR-TB), the increased number of institutions and 
funding streams do not translate into a sufficiently quick response, enhanced 
coordinated governance, or decisive global health leadership. Furthermore, 
despite increased DAH, it is still the case that most DAH funding is allocated to 
select diseases, mainly AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, which often results in 
underfunding for what are known as the ‘neglected diseases’. Moreover, 
although there have been excellent efforts to form partnerships within such 
frameworks as the GAVI Alliance, the Vaccine Alliance and the GFATM, the 
verdict on the long-term success of these pockets of targeted cooperation 
remains contested, since there is evidence to question whether these initiatives 
have translated into long-term health system strengthening or sustainable health 
delivery mechanisms (Coyne and Williams, 2014; Swanson et al, 2015). When 
considered at the macro-level, there clearly remains a significant gap between 
overall increases in institutional growth and DAH and the implementation of 
policy that delivers effective healthcare, a point that has led some to argue that 
current practice fails to improve global health outcomes overall (Coyne and 
Williams, 2014; Swanson et al, 2015). What this suggests is that despite all the 
growth in health expenditure and attention, global health cooperation remains 
significantly underperforming. 
 
Against this background, it is possible to locate key indicators symptomatic of 
global health gridlock as well as a number of recent pathways that suggest there 
are avenues through it. The gridlock heuristic highlights how the meteoric 
growth of global health governance since the year 2000 created a condition in 
which effective global policy-making is increasingly compromised due to rising 
transaction costs and policy coordination problems, exacerbated by an increased 
number of health actors that must operate within a narrow policy bandwidth. 
Viewing current global health governance through the lens of gridlock sheds 
light on the fact that global health cooperation today is underperforming not 
simply because it is very difficult to solve many global health problems, but 
because previous phases of global health mobilization have been incredibly 
successful in creating a large number of global health actors and programs, 
which, in turn, have produced unintended consequences that now complicate the 
coordination and problem-solving capacities of the health regime complex as a 
whole.  Yet, as we explore later in the chapter, there are also a number of 
potential avenues to increase cooperation and move through gridlock, despite 
the fact that global health governance, as a whole, continues to remain far from 
being ‘fit for purpose’. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to better understand the role of gridlock within global 
health as well as to locate potential mechanisms through and beyond it. 
Accordingly, the chapter first provides a mapping of global health gridlock. 
Second, the chapter will explore three pathways ‘through’ gridlock.  Although 
there are potentially many avenues through and even beyond global health 
gridlock, this chapter will specifically focus on three key pathways that offer the 
most promising avenues in current global health governance: 1) A realignment 
of major power interests around global infectious disease control; 2) Plurality 
around common International Health Regulations and SDG principles, and; 3) A 
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reinvigorated trend of innovative leadership by G7 countries and their 
institutional partners.  
 
1. Pathways to Gridlock in the Global Health Regime 
 
In an effort to understand global health gridlock and potential avenues through 
it, it is useful to identify four pathways to gridlock in global health governance: 
rising multipolarity, institutional inertia, harder problems, and institutional 
fragmentation (Hale et al, 2013). Each pathway can be thought of as a growing 
trend that embodies a specific mix of causal mechanisms related to global health 
governance. These pathways, when examined as a whole, often interrelate and 
conjoin to limit cooperative and effective problem solving and thus represent 
key barriers for the construction of more effective global health policies. 
 
1.1 Global Health Gridlock and Growing Multipolarity 
 
The total number of states has increased substantially over the last 70 years. 
More importantly, the number of states that must politically engage on a given 
issue—that is, the states without whose cooperation a global problem cannot be 
adequately addressed—has expanded by similar proportions. When the WHO 
was founded in 1948, it had 61 members. Today, it has over 190 who have to 
come together to agree on policy initiatives and implementation. Integrating the 
views of actors at different stages of development, with distinct but varying 
alignments, not to mention shifting interests, is extremely challenging and often 
difficult to achieve. The WHO has to achieve consensus between its 193 countries 
if policy is to be agreed and, accordingly, the weaving of coherent policy 
outcomes is often impossible (Kichbuch, 2015).  
 
During the Cold War competing interests were largely articulated through the 
struggle between the US and the Soviet Union. Today alignments are much more 
complicated as many of the developing countries have grown significantly in 
recent years and have become major investors and shareholders in the global 
health industry. As a result, power differentials are more diffused and 
donor/recipient relations no longer simply map on to the West/South divide. For 
example, new emerging powers such as Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa (BRICS) are having greater influence on global health policy (Harmer, 
2014). In addition, the BRICS are able increasingly to exert influence on WHO 
decision-making (Gautier et al, 2014), to provide access to medicines outside of 
traditional markets (Yu, 2008), to offer alternative sources of DAH (Chan, 2011; 
Cabral 2014), and to represent increasingly an alternative to Western ‘business 
as usual’ in global health (The Guardian, 2014; Bond and Garcia, 2015). 
 
 This increased multipolarity has in many ways helped to undermine WHO 
authority, since many influential states place more stringent conditions on the 
WHO and/or seek alternative policy mechanisms outside the UN system. For 
example, the WHO used to receive three-quarters of its financing from assessed 
contributions levied on members. However, a change to a zero real growth policy 
for its regular budget in the 1980s has meant it now only receives one-quarter of 
its budget from member contributions and is dependent on extra-budgetary 
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ring-fenced ‘pet project’ funding from donors to fill an increasingly shrinking 
budget (Sridhar and Gostin, 2011). As the money flows to bilateral or other 
multilateral initiatives, WHO authority dissipates, with numerous organizations 
like the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluations (IHME), the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation and Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) able to command greater 
epistemic authority (Shiffman, 2014), financial influence (Frenk and Moon, 
2013) and response effectiveness (The Guardian, 2015). Although these new 
institutions might represent one possible pathway ‘through’ gridlock, a real 
consequence of this development is also that many more countries and their 
organizational favorites (which represent a diverse range of interests) must 
agree in order for long-term and more effective global cooperation to occur. 
 
1.2 Institutional Inertia and Global Health Gridlock 
 
The 1945 postwar order succeeded, in part, because it incentivized great power 
involvement in key institutions. From the World Health Organization, to the 
United Nations Development Program, to the establishment of UNAIDS, to the 
programmes of the World Bank - key pillars of the global order explicitly granted 
special privilege to the countries that were wealthy and powerful at the time of 
their creation (Barnes and Brown, 2011; Hale et al, 2013). This hierarchy helped 
to secure the participation of the most important countries in global health 
governance. Today, the gain from this trade-off has shrunk while the costs have 
grown. As power shifts from West to East (the rise of China), North to South (the 
rise of BRICS or the G7 to G20), a broader range of participation and 
coordination is needed on nearly all global issues if they are to be dealt with 
effectively.  
 
As suggested above, under increased conditions of multipolarity it is becoming 
increasingly difficult for the WHO to find the authority and resources required to 
sustain a clear leadership role in global health. Negotiating its way through a 
landscape of shifting interests, and in an era where collective global action was 
frowned upon in the face of market triumphalism, it was difficult for the WHO to 
manoeuver successfully and reshape the organization in such a way that was 
both responsive and effective. As Kickbuch has observed:  
  
‘…over the last 30 years or so, the WHO member states - despite continuous 
verbal commitment to reform - have weakened their organization through 
significantly reducing its budget, refusing to change its regional structure 
and not being able to agree on the key mandate and functions of the 
organisation. Many of the policy processes enshrined in the constitution - 
such as the Executive Board and the World Health Assembly (WHA) have 
become dysfunctional; agendas are overloaded, meaningful debates are not 
easy and consensus based decisions are ever more difficult to achieve’ 
(Kickbuch, 2015, pp. 839-40). 
 
The WHO has all too often become a victim of its members’ interests at just the 
time when it needed more independent authority to act decisively. What has 
happened, specifically in the case of global health, is that many countries now 
pursue their interests elsewhere in a largely under-coordinated manner with 
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cooperation often being more about aligned interests than finding long-term 
solutions to global health needs (Barnes and Brown, 2011; Bruen and Brugha, 
2014; Brown, 2015; Kickbuch et al, 2013). This has resulted in a series of 
negative externalities in global health. For example, those with power hold onto 
asymmetrical influence through mandatory legal mechanisms like TRIPS and 
TRIPS-Plus (Muzaka, 2011) and/or through more subtle ‘soft-power’ donor 
insisted conditionalities associated with performance-based funding (Barnes et 
al, 2015); or settle on health priorities that can get broad global support in 
general terms (like the MDGs), but that leave the details of turning normative 
rhetoric into a decisive political action still wanting (Kickbuch et. al., 2013).    
 
1.3 Harder Problems and Global Health Gridlock 
 
As interdependence deepens, the types and scope of health related problems 
around which countries must cooperate has evolved. Problems are now both 
more extensive and intensive, and this increases the challenge of effective 
infectious disease control. Infectious diseases and threats such as Ebola, H1N1 
(swine flu), H7N9 (bird flu) MERS-CoV (novel coronavirus), Zika, Antimicrobial 
Resistance (AMR), and XDR-TB have grabbed headlines not only because of their 
potential global threat, but also due to past and existing confusion surrounding 
how global responses to transborder infectious diseases are organized (CNN, 
2015). Globalization also poses challenges for combating non-communicable 
diseases, such as heart disease, which are on the increase as Western lifestyles 
are mirrored within developing countries (Micha et al, 2012).  
 
Moreover, the ‘social determinants of health’ can be negatively impacted by 
global factors such as financial crises and unequal economic market conditions 
(Labonte et al, 2009). There are also major issues stemming from the impact of 
climate change, which has been predicted to lead to an increase in diseases such 
as malaria, diarrheal diseases, infectious disease such as HIV and AIDS as well as 
an increase in serious cardio respiratory difficulties (IPCC, 2014). In fact, there is 
significant evidence that this impact is already being felt, especially in the 
poorest countries (Hansen, et al, 2013; Chen, 2013). The problem is that in order 
to meet these challenges, health diplomacy must navigate a host of social, 
environmental, and cultural subjects, such as intellectual property, health and 
environmental standards and financial responsibility —about which countries 
and international organizations often disagree sharply. 
 
1.4 Fragmentation and Global Health Gridlock 
 
The institution-builders of the late 1940s operated in a far less crowed 
organizational space with only limited institutional path-dependencies like the 
League of Nations Health Organization, the Office International d’Hygiene 
Publique and the Pan American Sanitary Bureau to absorb into policy 
coordination. But efforts to cooperate internationally today occur in a dense 
institutional ecosystem shaped by large-scale and multivariate path dependency. 
The exponential rise in both multilateral and transnational organizations has 
created a more complex multilevel and multi-actor system of global health 
governance. For example, in 1909 the total number of intergovernmental 
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organizations in existence was 37. In 2014, the global health sector alone 
accounts for 3401 registered international institutions, associations and 
associated organizations (UIA, 2014). What is astounding is that this number 
does not include all bilateral health programs, such as those offered by USAID or 
the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), and further excludes 
many specific programs by multilateral international bodies that may have 
significant baring on health policy, i.e. the World Bank and UNICEF. This 
condition is further exacerbated and enhanced by the increase in multiploarity 
outlined above, since fragmented institutions often become avenues for more 
traditional forms of state brinkmanship and compliance avoidance. 
 
Within this dense web of institutions mandates can conflict, interventions are 
frequently uncoordinated, and all too typically scarce resources are subject to 
intense competition.  In this context, the proliferation of institutions can lead to 
dysfunctional fragmentation, reducing the ability of multilateral institutions to 
provide public goods. When funding and political will are scarce, countries need 
focal points to guide policy (Keohane and Martin, 1995), which can help define 
the nature and form of cooperation. Yet, when international regimes overlap, 
with multiple funding streams, these positive effects can be weakened. 
Fragmented institutions, in turn, can disaggregate resources and political will, 
while increasing transaction costs.  
 
This is an acute problem in global health since nearly all initiatives in high 
burdened countries are funded by multiple sources. These sources have their 
own monitoring, accounting and evaluation systems that are often not 
compatible with one another and/or with local systems. With increased health 
actors comes increased meetings and evaluations, which is widely reported as 
one of many capacity restraints faced by already weakened health systems 
(Barnes et al, 2015). The increased number of actors can also lead to an 
inefficient division of labor, where actors such as the WHO, Global Fund, PEPFAR, 
UNAIDS, USAID, BRICS, World Bank, Gates, and Clinton Foundation (to name 
only a few) often produce parallel programs or bric-a-brac vertical health silos 
that have not generated overall system strengthening in high burdened countries 
(Swanson et al, 2015; Montagu and Yamey, 2011). Although this is not always 
the case, and there are success stories (see below), the problem is that there is 
undoubtedly a marked level of fragmentation within global health policy, which 
can lead to diffused responsibility, unclear accountability chains and the 
potential for certain actors to escape or undermine global norm constraints and 
progress. 
 
2. Through and Beyond Global Health Gridlock 
 
Although different pathways can carry more significance in some health sectors 
than in others, the rapid growth in global health governance since 2000 has in 
many ways generated a condition in which effective global policy-making is 
increasingly slowed or stalled due to heightened transaction costs and policy 
coordination problems. While current practice overall does not represent a 
condition of gridlock, in the sense of the full paralysis of policy making, it is still 
the case that many areas are exhibiting features of gridlock. That is, a series of 
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second-order cooperation problems arising from previous phases of success in 
globalization and increases in global health response now complicate effective 
problem solving as well as long-term reform at the global level.  
 
Nevertheless, some recent positive trends signal pathways through gridlock 
within the global health regime. Three pathways stand out as particularly 
germane to global health: 1) A realignment of major power interests around 
global infectious disease control; 2) Plurality around common principles like the 
IHRs and SDGs, and; 3) Renewed trends of innovative leadership by the G7 and 
its institutional partners. 
 
2.1 Global Pandemics and Shifts in Major Powers’ Core Security Interests 
 
There has been widespread consensus that ‘the Ebola epidemic was a wake-up 
call for all of us’. This statement, jointly made by Angela Merkel, Barack Obama 
and David Cameron at the 2015 G7 Summit in Germany, reflects growing 
concern about the ability of countries and global institutions to respond 
effectively to the next global outbreak (Brown, 2015b). For example, the Ebola 
epidemic killed over 11,000 people, infecting over 27,000, and there is 
widespread recognition by the health community that the WHO (and global 
health governance more broadly) was poorly prepared to fight the outbreak. 
Particularly, it is widely held that there was a very slow global response to Ebola, 
that there was ineffective surveillance of the virus despite long-standing 
knowledge of its potential threat, that the alarm was not raised soon enough, 
that there was a general lack of health leadership across all sectors, a lack of 
coordination and emergency funding, and that there is a general lack of 
treatment and vaccines in relation to most diseases that represent global threats, 
including but not just Ebola.  
 
As part of this post-Ebola ‘call to arms’ two new global financing mechanisms 
were introduced in 2015 to support health emergency responses.  These are the 
WHO’s Contingency Fund for Emergencies (CFE) and the World Bank’s Pandemic 
Emergency Facility (PEF). In essence, the CFE was the bi-product of continued 
discussions around the International Health Regulations (IHRs) and was adopted 
at the Sixty-Eighth World Health Assembly. As part of a more coordinated global 
emergency response strategy, the CFE aims to fill the gap between the first 72 
hours of a declared health emergency and the time at which resources from 
other financing mechanisms begin to flow. The CFE covers all countries 
regardless of income in order to prevent an infectious disease from escalating 
into a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC), as defined in 
the IHRs, as well as to respond to other Grade 3 events with substantial public 
health consequences, whether disease related or not. The fund is triggered by 
national request and the level of funding is decided on a case-by-case basis (from 
a $100m fund), which can include funding for personnel, information technology 
and information systems, medical supplies, and field and local government 
support. Since its creation in 2015, the CFE has disbursed $8.5 million for a range 
of interventions related to the Zika virus in South America, Yellow Fever in 
central Africa, and draught related food insecurity in Asia.  Undoubtedly the CFE 
shows signs of promise, yet the program is still in its infancy and its success will 
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be determined by how well it continues to be funded, and how well it is 
implemented as a global first response.  
 
The PEF was established after the final 2015 G7 Communiqué in Germany and is 
currently in its final design phase at the World Bank with an expected launch at 
the end of 2016. The PEF was proposed by the G7 as an insurance mechanism 
that seeks to support and follow up measures in emergencies after initial CFE 
funds have been mobilized. It aims to do this by providing a surge of post-CFE 
funding for response efforts to prevent infectious disease outbreaks from 
becoming costly pandemics with a high global death toll. It notes, for example, 
epidemic risks from new orthomyxoviruses (new influenza pandemic virus A, B 
and C), coronaviridae (SARS, MERS), filoviridae (Ebola, Marburg) and other 
zoonotic diseases (Crimean Congo, Rift Valley, Lassa fever).  
 
The total level of funding for the PEF is estimated to be up to $500 million per 
outbreak. In many ways, this financial mechanism signals a significant response 
by major powers to the immediate failures associated with Ebola and thus 
represents a potentially powerful pathway through gridlock in fighting major 
disease outbreaks. The PEF will be financed through two delivery ‘windows’ 
initially underwritten by G7 countries: an insurance mechanism for funds up to 
$500 million, and an immediate cash injection between $50 and $100 million. In 
creating an insurance mechanism, the G7 and World Bank have suggested that 
the PEF will create a new market for pandemic insurance that will bring ‘greater 
discipline and rigor to pandemic preparedness and incentivize better pandemic 
response planning’. In addition, the World Bank anticipates SDG 3.8 (universal 
health coverage – see below) enhancement since it is foreseen that the PEF will 
‘stimulate efforts by countries and development partners to build better core 
public health capabilities for disease surveillance and health systems 
strengthening, toward universal health coverage’ (World Bank, 2016). Prima 
facie, this statement does suggest that the PEF should link into more long-term 
health system and capacity strategies, thus signaling a potentially robust move 
through multipolarity and fragmented gridlock. Yet, specific targets for 
measuring these aims for greater discipline and emergency preparedness have 
not yet been publicized and without clear enumeration it is hard to see exactly 
how the insurance scheme will promote health system strengthening of the sort 
that is recommended by both the IHRs and the SDGs. 
 
Although these new financing mechanisms are designed to fill important gaps in 
overall global emergency preparedness and demonstrate a level of coordinated 
interest by major powers, they also raise a number of questions regarding how 
they might provide a more comprehensive pathway through gridlock. First, these 
initiatives are the products of two very different global health governance 
processes, with the CFE being a product of the World Health Assembly and the 
PEF being underwritten by the G7 via the World Bank. Although both initiatives 
seek to respond to the failures of Ebola and, hence, to a significant consequence 
of gridlock, there are concerns that they are not sufficiently joined up in terms of 
how they link to already agreed IHR commitments as well as how they will draw 
from, and build, SDGs response capacities within regions and countries. Again, it 
is important to note that only the CFE has a formal relationship with the IHRs 
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and thus its catalogue of internationally agreed interventions. The CFE was set 
up within the context of an IHR recommendation, and located within the wider 
WHO Health Emergencies Programme (WHEP), as confirmed at the World 
Health Assembly in 2016. Therefore, unlike the PEF, it enjoys a level of global 
legitimacy, since it is available to all WHO member states, covers the full 
spectrum of cross border public health risks enumerated in the IHRs, and is 
managed under funding rules and institutional frameworks of the 
intergovernmental body.  
 
Second, there are concerns about whether the ‘securitization of health’ (with 
particular emphasis on infectious disease control) within the motivational logic 
of the major powers can sufficiently address the broader health risks associated 
with globalization. This is because the ‘securitizing of health’ prioritizes 
surveillance and containment, which many argue does so at the expense of more 
long-term and effective strategies that focus on prevention, detection and care 
via strengthened health systems (Rushton, 2011; Ruston and Youde, 2014).  For 
example, unlike the CFE, which covers Grade 3 emergencies, the PEF does not 
specifically mention funding for non-infectious disease related health 
emergencies, such as chemical poisonings or climate disaster. As a result, it 
remains unclear, as well as unlikely, that these sorts of health related 
emergencies would be covered under PEF guidelines. The implication is that 
these initiatives can at the moment be seen to represent only an investment in 
the securitization of global health by the G7 major powers, with their limited 
focus on surveillance and containment of infectious diseases, versus 
representing broader health initiatives required for reaching the SDGs beyond 
gridlock. 
 
Third, although the PEF initiative will no doubt have an impact on creating more 
effective health responses, there are concerns about the ‘global’ reach of the PEF. 
Unlike the CFE, only countries eligible for financing from the International 
Development Association (IDA - the World Bank’s fund for the poorest countries) 
can be beneficiaries of the PEF. This then raises a number of questions about 
coverage in areas where disease risks remain high. As one example, India is no 
longer eligible for IDA and thus will remain uncovered by PEF under its current 
design. This is despite the fact that India continues to have a high disease burden 
rate as well as significant global health security risks evidenced by high cases of 
XDR-TB and other forms of AMR such as methicillin-resistant staphylococcus 
aureus (MRSA). As mentioned above, the PEF is not included as a significant 
element within the WHEP, and is mentioned only as a fund that the CFE should 
be careful not to replicate. This raises concerns since it is the stated aim of WHEP 
for the WHO to be the sole coordinator for global emergency response and to 
limit DAH fragmentation. As a result, it is unclear how well the PEF can 
effectively cover health emergencies in all cases and about where health 
emergency relief can reliably be acquired in non-IDA cases (such as in India). 
Although a tightly aligned CFE and PEF could provide an effective avenue beyond 
gridlock, there is also potential for further fragmentation between the two 
misaligned initiatives.  
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Due to current policy ambiguities it is unclear whether both financial 
mechanisms can be seen as complimentary additions to more long-term global 
strategies to build preparedness capacities, and strengthen overall global SDGs 
responses. In addition, it is uncertain whether PEF will garner widespread ‘buy-
in’ and compliance as the G7 mandate moves forward. This is largely due to 
lingering doubts about PEF’s global representativeness, the fact that it is located 
outside the IHRs, and because of its perceived lack of political legitimacy. 
Therefore, as it stands, these emergency mechanisms only represent a possible 
pathway through gridlock. However, if they remain partly disconnected, and add 
to the fragmentation of efforts, they could also provide ripe conditions for 
continued gridlock and underperformance in global health. 
 
2.2 Coordinating Plurality around the IHRs and SDGs 
 
As the Introduction to this volume notes, pathways to or through gridlock rarely 
operate in isolation. The relationship between major power interests, global 
health security risks, health regulations, health goals and health outcomes are, as 
illustrated above, often interlinked within global health governance. As part of 
the health security discourse it is often recognized that many health systems 
remain too weak to prevent, monitor, track and respond to emerging global 
threats. It is not surprising, for example, that Ebola was most prevalent in African 
countries that had weak health systems. Many health experts have long argued 
the importance of better implementing the IHRs as well as for renewed efforts to 
strengthen regional and national health capacities around a set of common goals 
like the SDGs. For many, including major powers in the West, there is now an 
understanding that long-term health security is dependent on health system 
strengthening and increased global governance capacities, and that there is 
currently a deficit in this regard. This concern has been compounded recently by 
the fact that many diseases continue to be ‘neglected’ throughout all levels of 
health governance and, thus, get inadequate attention until it is often too late to 
avoid large-scale and highly expensive responses. In particular, over the last five 
years there has been a new policy focus on a diverse set of WHO recognized 
neglected tropical diseases (NTDs) that thrive mainly among the poorest and in 
the most unprepared health systems. It is estimated that 17 of the main NTDs 
affect more than 1.4 billion people and are endemic in 149 countries. In this way, 
the scope of potential risks is global. 
 
As a policy response, there have been increasing calls by global health actors for 
more robust health regulations and strategy targets. In line with the framework 
presented in this volume, it is possible to understand specific efforts within 
global health policy to coordinate multiple and diverse organizations around a 
common set of goals and norms. Although there have been a number of 
promising and successful policy efforts (such as the Framework Convention of 
Tobacco Control), there has been two particularly promising cooperative efforts 
around acceptance and implementation of the IHRs as well as a positive norm 
diffusion associated with the newly adopted Sustainable Development Goal 3.8, 
which focuses on universal health coverage (UHC).  
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The IHRs were adopted by member states in the World Health Organization 
(WHO) on 23rd May, 2005. They require that all countries have the ability to 
detect, assess, report and respond to potential public health emergencies of 
international concern at all levels of government, and to report such events 
rapidly to the WHO to determine whether a coordinated, global response is 
required. Under the agreement, countries were given until 2016 to prevent the 
spread of risk by developing core capacities to determine the control measures 
required, provide logistical detection capability, create investigative 
mechanisms, boost internal and external communication capabilities, and create 
robust national response plans (WHO 2005). 
 
The main coordinating feature of the IHRs, and thus the IHRs’ main mechanism 
for steering policies through gridlock, is the requirement that all state parties 
must have established the minimum public health core capacities by June 2016. 
From self-assessment reports sent to the WHO in 2015, many countries have 
made progress since 2012, most notably in surveillance and laboratory 
capacities, in legislation and in human resources (WHO 2015), including through 
an Integrated Disease Surveillance Response (WHO Afro 2015). In this way, the 
IHRs have provided a consistent policy focus to align multisectoral actors and 
regulate compliance. However, less progress has been reported regarding 
emergency preparedness, in capacities at points of entry to countries, and in 
dealing with chemical and food safety risks, suggesting poor preparedness in 
dealing with a wide range of public health risks (SEATINI and TARSC 2016). 
What this suggests, in terms of movement beyond gridlock, is that although 
common norms, regulations and goals have the ability to generate common 
policy drivers and outcomes, the effectiveness of those outcomes still rely on 
consistent reinforcement via financial and technical cooperation. Given the fact 
that the IHRs have only been partly met suggests that, despite widespread 
normative agreement, a more concerted effort to promote all aspects of IHR 
compliance is still needed. Without this the IHRs might lead to continued 
underperformance and gridlock, specifically as PEF and other non-aligned 
programs scale up. 
 
In order to mitigate gridlock it is necessary to strengthen the implementation of 
the IHRs so that they can act as the primary framework in the global health 
security agenda. As part of this the IHRs will require better short, medium and 
long term strategies and targets that work in a complementary manner, with 
funding directed to the full set of implementation capacities as well as more 
emphasis on sustainable funding for longer term health systems strengthening. 
Adopting this approach could offer new avenues through gridlock long-term, 
since a strength of the IHRs is that they are not limited to addressing 
emergencies after they have started, but also to build public health capacities to 
detect, prevent and control them. As a policy umbrella, other global health 
security measures could be aligned to the IHRs (see concerns with PEF above), 
and to measures in countries and regions, to build systems to detect, prevent, 
manage and respond to public health risks and emergencies. This would not only 
increase coverage, but also effectiveness. 
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In terms of providing additional overarching policy uniformity, one of the great 
innovations of the Sustainable Development Goals is that it situates all global 
development activities within its 17 development goals and 169 targets. In this 
way, if taken seriously, the potential for institutional pluralism to act as a 
mechanism for gridlock could be diminished by the SDGs. This unifying element 
is enhanced by the recent adoption of SDG 3.8, which enumerates universal 
health coverage (UHC) as the primary organizational norm. The norm is defined 
as the objective that ‘all people can use the promotive, preventive, curative, 
rehabilitative and palliative health services they need, of sufficient quality to be 
effective, while also ensuring that the use of these services does not expose the 
user to financial hardship’ (WHO, 2015b) 
 
It is too soon to determine the positive affects of the SDGs on global health policy 
coordination and its ability to counter gridlock. Nevertheless, there are a number 
of positive signs suggesting that the SDGs, and in particular UHC, could provide, 
what Keohane and Martin (1995) have described as, a necessary focal point for 
more coordinated global cooperation. First, unlike the MDGs, the SDGs have had 
a long and inclusive deliberative process that included an Open Working Group 
of 70 countries, a series of UN sponsored “Global Conversations”, 11 thematic 
consultations, 83 national consultations and several door to door surveys so as 
to capture population preferences. As a result, the SDGs enjoy a sense of 
perceived legitimacy and self-legislation, which should translate into improved 
compliance and implementation. Second, there is agreed recognition about the 
failures of the MDGs and there has been an upsurge in political will not to repeat 
past mistakes. Third, there is significant evidence suggesting that a majority of 
countries are already incorporating the SDGs into their national health 
strategies, which illustrates that the SDGs are already delivering some of their 
planned coordinative effects. Fourth, although the SDGs are clearly overly 
ambitious in terms of scope, they do help to sharpen development aims by 
framing them against 169 measurable targets. As part of this performance based 
model, it will be easier to track progress, locate policy and resource gaps, and to 
demand accountability in cases of non-compliance (for both developed and 
developing countries). Fifth, as will be discussed in the next section, the SDGs - 
and particularity UHC – has been diffused and adopted by the major powers and 
key institutions as a master concept and norm. For example, UHC has been 
explicitly stated as the guiding norm in global health development by key 
institutions such as the G7, G20, G77, the World Bank, the GFATM, the GAVI 
Alliance, PETFAR, the New Development Bank, the BRICS, the EU, USAID, AU, 
ASEAN, all UN agencies, BMGF, and many more. Sixth, the link between the SDGs, 
UHC and health system strengthening is being driven by key global health 
leaders as well as by a majority of developing countries (see below). This starts 
to address a main failure in MDGs thinking, but also sharpens long-term health 
development aims that seek to end DAH dependency cycles and 
underperformance. In this respect, there are promising signs that the SDGs will 
at least enjoy faster and more sustained affect than the MDGs, which could 
alleviate disjointed multipolarity, underperformance and policy fragmentation.  
 
2.3 New Global Health Leadership by the G7 and Associates 
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As stated above, pathways through gridlock overlap and there are often 
multifarious policy interplays between the motivational interests of major 
powers, the norms and institutions created to secure those interests, and the 
diffusion of those norms across sectors. Moreover, these governance pathways 
are often intersected and influenced by specific global health leaders who can 
produce innovations within existing pathways or construct new pathways to fill 
existing deficits. These leaders can be motivated by shifts in self-interests in 
alignment with others or by broader recognition of the need for norm 
entrepreneurship in the face of collective action problems. In global health it is 
possible to witness an increased number of new and old actors assuming 
leadership roles in an effort to navigate through existing health gridlock.  
 
In terms of non-traditional leadership the last ten years have seen the rise of 
influential global foundations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 
(BMGF) and the Clinton Foundation. Although there are meaningful debates 
about whether organizations like BMGF have disproportionately positive or 
negative authority in global health policy, it is impossible to ignore the massive 
funding provided by these foundations as well as their ability to provide 
epistemic leadership. In the case of BMGF, its leadership in global health has led 
to the creation of the IHME, and it has become the largest donor to the GFATM 
during the financial crisis, and a key broker in a number of key health initiatives 
centred around evidence based policy making in health. 
 
Although innovations associated with non-traditional leadership sources can be 
effective, it is still the case that most global health innovations are driven by 
powerful states and their collective coordinating and financial power. For 
example, there is a long tradition of G7 leadership giving a vital injection of 
political and financial support to global health. Perhaps the best illustration of 
this is from the 2000 Summit in Okinawa, where the then G8 agreed to support 
the establishment of GFATM. In Japan the G8 stated that diseases like HIV/AIDS, 
malaria and TB were having large-scale negative affects on global economic 
growth, development and health security. In order to curb these threats, the G8 
facilitated the creation of the Transitional Working Group to design the new 
institution, while also pledging an initial funding round of 10 billion USD to help 
launch the institution’s funding efforts. This act of leadership has had profound 
impacts on global responses to infectious disease (although adding to 
fragmentation). According to the GFATM, the estimated result of this particular 
leadership injection has been the saving of 17 million lives since its 
establishment in 2002, with an additional 2 million lives predicted to be saved 
each year. Moreover, the Fund’s efforts within participating countries has 
equated to a 40% decrease in new HIV/AIDS cases, a 29% reduction in 
tuberculosis, and a 48% decrease in new Malaria infections since 2002. Although 
a direct causal pathway between these reductions and the interventions of the 
GFATM is difficult to determine (due to the fact that national programs also play 
a huge role), it is clear that the GFATM has made a significant contribution to 
improving population health.  
 
More recently, as a direct response to the failure to meet MDG goals 4 and 5, the 
G7 provided the catalyst for the creation of the Global Financial Facility (GFF). 
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Designed as a financial component to the SDGs, GFF was announced in 
September 2014 to help close the funding gap for reproductive, maternal, 
newborn, child, and adolescent health. In order to enhance greater collaboration, 
the fund is delivered through the World Bank, but in compliance with the UN 
Secretary General’s Every Woman Every Child Global Strategy 2.0. As part of the 
GFF, a total of 62 high-burden, low and lower-middle income countries are 
eligible to receive grant resources. As of now, the GFF is phasing in its 
operations, beginning with an initial set of four “frontrunner” countries—the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania, with Bangladesh, 
Cameroon, India, Liberia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal and Uganda announced 
as the second wave of GFF countries to be funded from 2016. Countries are 
eligible for between US$10 and US$60 million over a three to four year period. 
 
Again in an attempt to move through gridlock and correct past response failures 
to diseases like SARS and Ebola, the G7 in 2016 reaffirmed the WHO’s central 
role in coordinating rapid and effective responses to public health emergencies 
as well as restating the G7’s commitment to the Global Health Security Agenda 
(GHSA). As part of the overall health security agenda, the G7 urged the WHO to 
implement rapidly its emergency reforms, including the full roll-out of its One 
WHO approach as well as calling on the international community to support the 
WHO’s new CFE, which enables an injection of money and technical expertise 
within 24 hours of a declared emergency. The G7 has also assigned the creation 
of PEF to the World Bank, as noted earlier, and invited the international 
community to further lend their financial and technical support to PEF. In a 
welcome shift of discourse, the G7 has now also made an explicit request for 
better alignment of the CFE and PEF initiatives, in order to protect against 
gridlock by creating a more comprehensive and coordinated global health 
architecture.  
 
In response to similar concerns raised in the sections above, there are also 
renewed efforts by the G7 to link explicitly the IHRs to the GHSA as well as to key 
health related initiatives, such as the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) tool, the 
Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) food nutrition efforts, the new Health 
Emergency Program, and the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). In 
addition, the G7 is backing AMR programs as part of GHSA by promoting and 
financially stimulating efforts associated with the One Health Approach, and its 
connection to the IHRs, the 2016 High Level Meetings on AMR at the United 
Nations, the EU Ministerial One Health Conference, the Tokyo Meeting of Health 
Ministers on AMR, and the GHSA AMR Action Package. Although it is too soon to 
determine whether leadership here will help move beyond gridlock by linking 
various health security streams, these meetings do offer the opportunity for 
creating more robust and cooperative strategies.  
 
In making a clear link between the IHRs and other health security activities, the 
G7 has suggested that the IHRs are a key mechanism for better organizing global 
health governance. This has significant meaning since by promoting the IHRs the 
G7 has effectively advanced a policy mechanism that has traditionally generated 
a high level of ‘buy-in’ from the WHA, the 196 signature countries, as well as a 
majority of high disease burdened communities. In addition, in the face of widely 
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recognized disease response failures, the IHRs represent a crucial detection and 
prevention mechanism that, in principle, strengthens protective measures 
against pandemic diseases. What this potentially signals, when viewed 
optimistically, is a move toward a more legitimate alignment of global health 
policies, in which the internationally agreed IHRs can help steer and legitimate 
on-going global health policies through gridlock.  
 
Yet, perhaps the most significant leadership move through potential gridlock 
relates to the G7’s recent recognition of the importance of UHC and its necessary 
connection to health system strengthening. What is most promising in terms of 
breaking gridlock is the fact that the G7 positioned UHC as the overarching 
normative framework in global health. This was done by bringing key global 
health initiatives under the umbrella of UHC as a master concept. For example, 
the G7 positioned the work of both the WHO and the World Bank as essential 
representatives of a UHC approach to health. In doing so, the G7 also listed key 
new initiatives such as the GFF as needing to fit into an overall UHC framework. 
What is perhaps most promising in terms of global health effectiveness is the fact 
that the G7 has also linked the GHSA to the health systems strengthening 
approach, which stresses a long-term global health strategy from the ground up 
and affirms that security and health systems are co-constituted (Brown and 
Stoeva, 2014). As the official G7 Leader’s Summit Declaration states: 
 
‘We reiterate our commitment to enhance our support and coordination to 
strengthen health systems, especially in developing countries, to make 
them more resilient, inclusive, affordable, sustainable, and equitable. To 
this end, we emphasize the need for a strengthened international 
framework to coordinate the efforts and expertise of all relevant 
stakeholders… we support the establishment of UHC 2030 that seeks to 
ensure the International Health Partnership principles… and to promote 
and catalyze [through establishing a UN envoy] efforts toward UHC across 
different sectors.’ 
 
The implications of this leadership position on UHC are potentially dramatic. 
First, by presenting UHC as a master concept in global health, the G7 has 
effectively signaled their ‘buy-in’ to SDG 3, as well as to its most ambitious target 
for UHC. Second, by doing so, the G7 endorsed the UCH 2030 Alliance, which 
seeks to create a political and coordinated forum that can deliver on SDG 3.8. By 
backing this initiative, the G7 solidified the Alliance’s role as a key international 
health partner and further gave the forum the needed authority to help manage 
the complexities of global gridlock. Third, the emphasis placed on ‘country-led 
HSS’ as a means to effectively deliver UHC is also important to note. Although it is 
too early to tell, G7 commitments could represent the kind of normative shift 
that many global health experts have been arguing is needed to move beyond 
gridlock. Finally, it is necessary to underscore the significance of linking HSS to 
long-term health security, since a failure to do so in the past has often been a 
source of criticism – where health security favors surveillance and containment 
rather than HSS, which itself favors long-term preventative strategies aimed to 
remove future threats through strengthened health systems (Rushton, 2011; 
Brown and Stovea, 2014). Although it is clear that health security is still the 
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dominant motivator for the G7, and there are still concerns about the role of PEF 
within the IHRs and SDGs (see above), it nevertheless could represent a 
significant first step towards a more sophisticated and comprehensively long-
term global health strategy through and beyond gridlock. 
 
However, there remain reasons to be cautious. First, although the G7 supported 
better coordination through the UHC 2030 Alliance, they have not yet offered 
financial support. Second, in relation to AMR, the G7 has remained lackluster in 
promoting cooperative research and development opportunities. One argument 
for this reluctance relates to traditional issues surrounding intellectual property 
rights and concerns for the protection of G7 corporate interests. Although this 
reading might be overly cynical, it remains the case that the G7 has only been 
vaguely willing ‘to consider potential for new incentives to promote R&D’, 
stopping far short of providing any tangible leadership or financial commitment. 
At present, the exception has been Britain, who pledged over £300 million to 
finance national and global support for exploring new collaborations and 
research in AMR. 
 
Having said this, it would, all things being equal, be churlish to overlook the G7’s 
positive leadership role in global health since 2000 as well as their seeming 
reenergized efforts to better coordinate global policies since 2014. In particular, 
the G7 shows revitalized interest in embedding the language of UCH into the 
global health lexicon, thus providing additional opportunities through gridlock 
via common norms and goals. In this way, renewed leadership in global health by 
G7 countries offers some needed pathways through gridlock while suggesting 
that once again, like with the creation of the GFATM in Okinawa in 2000, the G7 
can lay the seeds for more fit-for-purpose global health policy. The key, however, 
is making sure that these new global health initiatives take stock of past 
fragmentations that resulted from rapid and uncoordinated growth, so that they 
are joined up and guided by a limited number of rules that promote coordinated 




In many ways the three pathways above represent potentially powerful 
mechanisms through gridlock. Although there is still much more that needs to be 
done in order to unravel existing gridlock - in particular to limit 
counterproductive competitiveness in DAH and unclear institutional 
jurisdictions - there are some promising signs. The key is to recognize that 
expansive sectorial growth in global health without meaningful coordination can 
disrupt and undermine the effectiveness of global health policy. As a result, there 
needs to be recognition of the importance of better partnerships not just more 
partnerships, since more does not always equal better (Barnes and Brown, 
2011). Recognition of gridlock can help us search for a politics beyond gridlock 
and to strengthen current initiatives that provide realistic pathways through it. 
In addition, by applying gridlock as a heuristic device we are able to assess 
critically new efforts to coordinate global health policy (like between INRs, PEF 
and CFE) as well as highlight potential areas of under-coordination that could 
exacerbate existing underperformance. 
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Understanding conditions of gridlock and avenues through it represents a hugely 
significant and important task. In global health governance this becomes 
particularly true as we embark on the monumental task of achieving the SDGs, 
while also facing acute health challenges such as the rise of AMR, the health 
affects of spreading Western diets, increasing climate related disease, and 
amplified social determinants of health associated with growing global 
inequalities. Thus, it is only by recognizing the conditions of gridlock and by 
creating pathways through them that global health policy will be able to tackle 
the health related collective action problems that threaten our planet (Bruen and 
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